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From amorphous networks to politico-epistemic 
communities? In search of an ESDP model 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In this paper I try to locate the geopolitical milieu in which ideas are generated and 
flourish. In order to achieve this I will provide a framework which locates ESDP 
actors who act as the ‘carriers’ of the EU strategic culture. The chapter on the theory 
of strategic culture demonstrates that each ‘political community’ has its own strategic 
culture. Based on this assumption I analyse three different models which are strongly 
related to the idea of ‘community-like’ driven groups of policy such as security 
communities, politico-epistemic communities and policy networks.  
 
The chapter begins as a decoding exercise of the geopolitical milieu of the EU which 
consists of the EU security community plus the pressures, threats and crises from the 
external environment. The notion of security community is analysed in detail. It is 
suggested that two different types of networks characterise the functioning of the 
security community: Policy Networks and Politico-Epistemic Communities (POEC). 
These formations emerge within institutions but also outside or between different 
institutions. The explanatory framework which is developed in this chapter takes into 
account: (a) the external pressures that emerge in the geopolitical milieu thus affecting 
the nature of the EU security community, (b) the creation of community/networks 
formation, (c) the institutional framework within which these formations are 
manifested (or the absence of it). 
 
The idea of security communities is further developed by suggesting that policy 
networks and communities play a vital link in maintaining it active. Furthermore, the 
literature on policy communities/networks is enriched by the creation of a new notion 
which emerged after the merging of two models (policy communities, epistemic 
communities) into one inclusive definition. The chapter also concludes by combining 
different theoretical elements in order to construct a measuring model of the strategic 
culture of the EU. It is argued that the ‘maturity’ of the EU strategic culture depends 
on the nature of the inter-institutional links (which exercise functions similar to these 
of veins for the human body). If policy networks tend to be more dominant then one 
expects a less cohesive and sometimes weak strategic culture. However if networks 
consolidate their position and evolve into policy communities then the nature of 
strategic culture changes into a ‘thicker’ one.  
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2. Constructing an inclusive framework of analysis  
 
Table 1. The geopolitical milieu of the EU security 
community 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I suggest that the EU functions within a complicated framework which I call the 
‘geopolitical milieu’. Within this geopolitical milieu exists a circle which includes the 
different elements that make up the security community of the EU. The geopolitical 
milieu is open to many different pressures ( manifested in the diagram as           ) 
emerging from geopolitical changes, crises and the new security demands of the post 
Cold War period (ethnic cleansing, violence, instability, authoritarianism etc). These 
pressures penetrate the environment of the EU security community and consequently 
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consists of EU institutions which interact with other important players such as 
international organizations and NGOs. Due to the frequent interaction amongst the 
various security actors of the EU community a complex network of relationships is 
established. These relationships are maintained through the social interaction of actors 
who establish patterns of cooperation through the creation of policy networks (named 
as PONE in the table). Policy networks are important for the maintenance of the 
security community mechanism of the EU. Without them no such community could 
have existed.  
 
The notion of security communities has been introduced by Karl Deutsch. Deutsch 
argues that the North Atlantic states were successful in creating a pluralistic security 
community in which the use of force between members was almost unthinkable 
(Deutsch et al 1957). A security community, furthermore, is a group of countries, 
which has become “integrated”. By integration ‘we mean the attainment, within a 
territory, of a “sense of security” and of institutions and practices strong and 
widespread enough to assure…dependable expectations of “peaceful change” among 
its population. By sense of community we mean a belief...that common social 
problems must and can be resolved by processes of “peaceful change” (Karl Deutsch 
et al 1957: 5). In addition, ‘security communities are characterised by the absence of 
war, and the absence of significant organized preparations for war such as military 
contingency planning. Competitive military build-ups or arms races between members 
of the claimed security community should also not be present’ (Nicholas Khoo 2004: 
38). A security community can be either an amalgamated security community or a 
pluralistic one. Karl Deutsch suggests that an amalgamated security community exists 
whenever there is the “formal merger of two or more previously independent units 
into a single larger unit, with some type of common government after amalgamation.” 
(Deutsch b: 1969: 6). On the contrary, the notion of pluralistic security communities 
implies that separate governments cooperate within an established framework.  
 
 
ii. characteristics of a pluralistic security community 
 
Deutsch, Adler and Barnett mention the existence of ‘pluralistic security 
communities’. According to Adler and Barnett a pluralistic security community is 
defined ‘as a transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people 
maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change’ (Adler and Barnett 1998: 31). 
Adler and Barnett suggest that a pluralistic security community has three 
characteristics: ‘First, members of a community have shared identities, values, and 
meanings. […] Secondly, those in a community have many-sided and direct relations: 
interaction occurs not indirectly and in only specific and isolated domains, but rather 
through some form of face-to-face encounter and relations in numerous settings. 
Thirdly, communities exhibit a reciprocity that expresses some degree of long-term 
interest and perhaps even altruism; long term interest derives from knowledge of 
those with whom one is interacting, and altruism can be understood as a sense of 
obligation and responsibility.’ (Adler & Barnett 1998: 31). The pluralistic version of 
security community which fits the EU is that of a no-war community, a community of 
states that have developed a considerable level of trust which is manifested in the 
absence of military clashes between states which belong to the community. Although 
states have different interests it is argued that these interests will be influenced by 
group interaction. Even if interests among states diverge there is still a process of 
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gradual abandonment of the use of military force in order to settle disputes. It should 
be added that a group of states that depends heavily on enforcement mechanisms is 
not a security community (e.g. the Warsaw Pact).  
 
Adler and Barnett suggest that a formation such as the EU is an uncontested security 
community and is organised around three tiers: ‘(1) precipitating conditions; (2) 
process variables (transactions, organizations, and social learning) and structural 
variables (power and knowledge); and (3) mutual trust and collective identity.’ (Adler 
and Barnett 1998: 17). Other scholars who characterise the EU as a security 
community directly imply that the above conditions have been met (Eilstrup-
Sangiovanni 2005, Cornish and Edwards 2001, Adler and Barnett 1998). Geographic 
proximity and the new technologies on communications are factors that contributed to 
the creation of an EU security community. However geographic proximity and 
technology do not necessarily lead to a security community. For instance, the 
conditions for a security community are not present in other areas such as the Asia-
Pacific region because the region: ‘encompasses a diverse mixture of rival great 
powers, thorny territorial disputes, unresolved historical memories, competing 
political ideologies, painful economic transitions, shifting military balances and 
diverging cultures.’ (Ikenberry and Tsuchiyama 2002: 69) 
 
The process of building a security community is a gradual one. According to Deutsch 
the whole process first starts with the allocation of small modest tasks to the security 
community. If the security community is successful it then receives more important 
tasks and consequently is  upgraded  to a community of overall amalgamation 
(Deutsch 1978: 246-247). The ‘internal behaviour’ of  security communities is 
analysed by Deutsch (1978). The process of integration includes a process of ‘habit 
breaking’. It is suggested that a new attractive ‘way of life’ has to emerge (in the EU 
case the idea of European integration). This new way of life will give rise to 
expectations of a better future which will render common collective expectations 
credible.  Expectations will provide national populations and their political elites with 
a sense of unity, new interests and new ambitions. Second, the existing sense of unity 
has to be supported by the emergence of an external challenge which requires some 
new and joint response. Finally, a new generation will assume the earlier degree of 
common interest for granted, and treat it as the starting point for new political actions. 
The third occurs roughly every 15 years. (Deutsch 1978: 248).  
 
It is important to mention that security communities succeed  through a combination 
of closure and creativity. Part of the process involves phasing out all different 
competing proposals and alternatives, so as eventually to channel all political 
attention towards their preferred solution(s). This is possible because security 
communities are characterised by means of the originality and resourcefulness. 
(Deutsch 1978: 250). It is also important to notice that the external environment 
influences the process of community building. The spread of intellectual movements 
and traditions favouring integration and preparing the political climate for it are 
important necessary elements in order to maintain a community active (Deutsch 1978: 
251).  
 
However, the creation of a pluralistic security community does not automatically 
guarantee its existence for the years to come. A security community is likely to have 
setbacks and failures. According to Deutsch there are certain conditions which are 
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likely to make for a disintegration of a community (Deutsch 1978: 244). These 
conditions are presented below: 
 
1. any steep increase in economic, military, or political burdens on the 
community or on any participating unit  
2. A rapid increase in social mobilization and political participation, faster than 
the process of civic assimilation to the common political culture of the 
community 
3. A rapid increase in regional, economic, cultural, social, linguistic, or ethnic 
differentiation, faster and stronger than any compensating integrative process 
4. A serious lag of decline in the political or administrative institutions and 
capabilities of the government and the political elite, relative to the current 
tasks and burdens with which they have to cope 
5. A relative closure of the political elite, slowing drastically the entry of new 
members and ideas, and giving rise to hostile counter-elites of frustrated 
potential elite members 
6. A failure of the government and the elite to carry out in time needed reforms 
and adjustments wanted or expected by the population or failure to adjust in 
time to the imminent decline or loss of some privileged or dominant minority 
position (e.g. the white minority in the former Federation of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland). 
 
In the EU case there have been certain challenges to the ESDP security community 
that can be linked to the framework mentioned above.  For instance, the 
modernisation of the armed forces is a prestigious but expensive task that poses a 
challenge to the restrained budgets of many EU member states (condition 1). The 
experiment of enlargement can be also seen as ‘a rapid increase in political 
participation that goes much faster than the process of civic assimilation (condition 2). 
Although there has not been a decline in regional transactions it is noteworthy that the 
belief in nationalism has not died out and that national political elites continue to 
support intergovernmental methods of transaction (condition 3). However, there have 
been no signs of institutional decline as new institutions emerged through the creation 
of ESDP. Therefore, ESDP can be seen as a case of institutional regeneration rather 
than institutional decline (condition 4). In terms of elite interaction it is hardly evident 
that ESDP is not open to new elites. For example, East European member states have 
their ESDP representatives and fully participate in ESDP structures. There has been 
no particular problems with the arrival of the new states and the idea of constructive 
abstention allows ‘difficult’ members (e.g. Denmark) to abstain rather than boycott 
the process.  Finally at the level of reform/adjustment (condition 6), ESDP has been 
created to address  the new security challenges thus it is a project of reform itself. 
Therefore, although challenges do exist (condition 1, 2, and 3), the role of elites and 
institutions as well as the relative success of ESDP operations serve as balancing acts 
to the disintegration of the EU security community.  
 
 
In addition, each security community is also characterised by three phases of 
development: the “nascent”, “ascendant” and “mature” phase. The EU is combines 
elements from both the second and third category (Webber forthcoming) 
 
 7
Phase I  The Nascent phase 
 
The nascent phase is the initial phase in the formation of the security community. 
Early in the course of the integrative process, a psychological “no war” community 
often develops. War among the prospective partners comes to be considered as 
illegitimate. Even when some of the prospective partner countries find themselves on 
opposite sides in some larger international conflict, they try to avoid opposing each 
other (Deutsch 1978: 246). In this phase governments do not explicitly seek to create 
a security community but they mostly understand that they share similar interests that 
would be better achieved through common action. The process of building a security 
community is encouraged by exogenous forces such as a change in technology, 
demography, economics, the environment, the development of new interpretations of 
social reality and the emergence of external threats.  
 
Phase II Ascendant Phase 
 
This phase is characterised by ‘increasingly dense networks: new institutions and 
organizations that reflect either tighter military coordination and cooperation and/or 
decreased fear that the other represents a threat; cognitive structures that promote 
“seeing” and acting together and therefore, the deepening of the level of mutual trust, 
and the emergence of collective identities that begin to encourage dependable 
expectations of peaceful change’ (Adler & Barnett 1998: 53). At this particular level 
one can see that the multiple channels that existed in the nascent phase are extended 
and intensified. This is an interesting period because one sees the first cognitive 
changes in the notion of national self-interest. In terms of discourse ‘Europe’ 
penetrates the national vocabulary thus leaving its mark on the notion of national 
identity.  This is a very important element because it helps the process of change. 
According to Weaver: ‘a re-assertion of national “self-interest” will be less 
problematic when the self has changed to a less narrow form. In this case, in a 
direction, where the national “self” contains a narrative with Europe as required 
component.’ (Waever 1998: 94). Therefore, getting closer to a particular security 
community (in our case the EU) and approaching it through the process of 
‘Europeanisation’ is seen as a new national aim. A new kind of ‘Europeanised’ 
knowledge, new transactions amongst players and the participation in EU 
organizations lead to social learning. One has to take into account the fact that ‘the 
security community paradigm is therefore a socially based phenomenon, which is 
premised on shared knowledge, ideational forces, and a dense normative 
environment’ (Ngoma 2003: 19). Gradually, the actors who are involved in the 
process begin to transform the environment in which they are acting. A security 
community thus may bring changes in attitude which can lead to further cooperation 
among states.  
 
Phase III: The Mature Phase 
 
In this period one sees the implementation of the necessary conditions of dependable 
expectations of peaceful change-mutual trust/collective identity. The more interaction 
and institutionalisation of the community takes place, the more war amongst security 
community states becomes less probable. As the threat of war among member states 
of a community is avoided and cooperation is intensified then a type of commonly 
owned foreign policy emerges that periodically expands thus encompassing new 
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issues leading the member states to assume a common identity. Further integration 
leads to the consolidation of this process thus attributing an element of maturity to the 
community. Mutual aid becomes a matter of habit and threat no more comes from the 
insiders but from the outsiders. This leads to changes in military planning as 
community states are not perceived as threats any longer by the other states of the 
community. In addition, a common definition of the external threat and a new security 
discourse emerge which begin to dominate the language of the community (Adler & 
Barnett 1998: 56). Still, it is worth mentioning that this transformation can take a long 
time as ‘identification of friend or foe, the social basis of trust, is a judgement based 
on years of experiences and encounters that shapes the cultural definition of threat.’ 
(Adler & Barnett, 1998: 46). One of the major outcomes that characterises this 
normative change is the process of ‘othering’. Adler and Barnett also suggest that one 
of the basic elements of security communities is the development of a ‘we-feeling’ 
amongst the members of a community as well as  the feeling of mutual trust. This 
process is vital to the creation of the ‘other’. In this stage security communities can be 
branded either as ‘loosely-coupled’ or tightly coupled ones.  The characteristics of 
tightly coupled security communities are: cooperative and collective security, a high 
level of military integration, policy coordination against “internal” threats, free 
movements of populations, internationalization of authority. In addition, ‘security 
communities can be categorised according to their depth of trust, the nature and 
degree of institutionalization of their governance system, and whether they reside in a 
formal anarchy or are on the verge of transforming it.’ (Adler & Barnett 1998: 30).  
 
Due to the complex relationships that emerge within the geopolitical milieu of the EU 
many different networks are created. However not all of these networks exert the 
same influence. Different elements of the security community are bounded together 
either by institutionalised links (e.g. the EU-NATO relationship) or non-
institutionalised ones (e.g. the personal relationships between EU actors and other 
NGOs/think tanks/national leaders). These relationships are strengthened by the 
creation of networks that can be categorised as policy networks or policy 
communities. Policy networks can evolve into policy communities. The table of the 
EU geopolitical milieu demonstrates that policy networks are vital for the functioning 
of the EU security community because they bring different actors together by 
facilitating communication. By acting as the official or unofficial links between 
different players policy networks galvanise the functions of institutions. Without 
efficient policy networks the security community system could not have functioned  
properly and it could have even collapsed. The next session of this chapter deals with 
the issue of policy networks and policy communities.  
 
 
 
3. Policy Networks 
 
The idea of policy networks has been used to describe transnational dealings of actors. 
For example the idea of a ‘Global public policy network’ is a term used to identify 
policy networks which consist of policy actors who are simultaneously operating 
within the structures of their states as well as above (supranational structures). These 
networks are ‘alliances of government agencies, international organisations, 
corporations and elements of civil society that join together to achieve what none can 
accomplish alone…and give once ignored groups a greater voice in international 
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decision making’ (Reinicke, 1999/2000) 1. The organisation of the network relies on 
informal patterns. Networks tend to cohere around international organisations when 
governments group together to discuss certain issues.  
 
i. definition 
 
A policy network can be described as a loosely constructed group of individuals 
including many different actors (professionals, scholars, NGO activists, officials, 
politicians, national leaders etc) who meet in order to exchange views on certain 
issues and policies. Contacts between the network members fluctuate in frequency. 
Members might share similar beliefs and ideas but these do not necessarily affect 
policy behaviour because the network relies on a sense of personal freedom. 
Therefore, frequent differentiation from the ‘core’ is not punished and actors retain 
their autonomy. There may be no clear agenda to follow and no clear aim to achieve. 
However, different network actors might join forces from time to time in order to 
achieve common aims. Certain unwritten rules of behaviour within the network 
constrain actors. Those who do not abide by the rules are likely to be gradually ‘cut 
off’ from the process of mainstream interaction.  
 
ii. characteristics 
 
A basic characteristic of a policy network is that it has a consultative (sometimes 
benchmarking) character. It lacks much of the community spirit that characterises 
policy communities. For those actors who are active in a policy network their 
participation seems more of a zero-sum game. Networks have usually a larger 
membership than policy communities as they are looser formations and therefore 
more accessible to those actors who want to join in. According to Marsh and Rhodes 
each member of a policy network: ‘deploys its resources, whether constitutional/legal, 
organizational, financial, political or informational to maximize influence over 
outcomes whilst trying to avoid becoming dependent on the other players’ (Marsh and 
Rhodes 1992: 11). This is very different from the sense of community feeling that 
exists within a policy community where members share ideas and values and where 
these ideas can act as norms. In such  policy community members have access to 
equal resources and even create a ‘common ownership’ feeling amongst themselves. 
On the contrary, the policy network model reflects the fact that its members have 
unequal resources. However, not all networks are the same: there are tight policy 
networks and loose policy networks. The differentiation between them lies in the fact 
that: ‘tight policy networks persist in large part, because they are characterised by a 
large degree of consensus, not necessarily on specific policy but rather on policy 
agenda’ (Marsh and Smith 2000: 6). Rhodes distinguishes between different types of 
networks along two dimensions: first according to the pre-eminence of the interests 
that constitute the network, and second, according to the cohesiveness of the group. 
On one hand, there are large atomized networks, with no close professional, producer 
or governmental relations which are ‘issue networks’. On the other hand, as it will be 
demonstrated later in the chapter, there are closely knot networks, characterised by 
stable relations and restrictive memberships named ‘policy communities’. (Marsh and 
                                                 
1 Analysis of Reinicke in Stone, D. Maxwell, S., Keating M., ‘Bridging Research and Policy’, 
Warwick University, 16-17 July 2001, http://gdnet.org/pdf/Bridging.pdf  
Accessed on 20/10/2005 
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Rhodes 1997, Adshead 2002: 16). More loosely and single-minded networks are 
named ‘issue networks.’ ( see table 2). However, it is important to say that there is 
always the possibility of ‘network evolution’. It is quite possible that certain networks 
will evolve from being uninstitutionalised policy networks to institutionalised policy 
communities. Thus , networks can be perceived as a proto-community, an early stage 
in the process of a community formation.  
 
Table 2: Marsh and Rhodes typology of networks (Source Rhodes (1997: 44) 
 
            Dimension                           Policy Community                    Issue Network     
No. of participants                    very limited number (exclusion)                                     Large 
 
Type of interest                       economic /professional interests                                 a range of interests 
 
Integration 
 
Frequency Of integration 
         
 
                                            Frequent, high quality, interaction of all groups           Contacts fluctuate in  
                                            on all maters related to policy issue                           frequency and intensity 
 
Continuity                          Membership, values and outcomes                   access fluctuates significantly 
                                    persistent over time 
 
Consensus                         All participants have resources                   a measure of agreement exists but 
                            And accept the legitimacy of the outcome                …….. conflict is ever present 
 
Resources 
 
Distribution of 
Resources within        All participants have resources, basic relationship      some participants may have 
Network                     is an exchange relationship                                           resources, but they are  
                                                                                                                       limited and basic relation- 
                                                                                                                       ship is consultative 
 
Distribution of resources within participating organizations 
 
                     Hierarchical, leaders can deliver members                        Varied and variable,  
                                                                                                               distribution and capacity to  
                                                                                                                 regulate members 
 
Power               There is a balance of power among members.                Unequal powers 
                      Although one group may dominate, it must                        reflecting unequal 
                       Be a positive-sum game if the community                        resources and unequal 
                      Is to persist                                                                          access. It is a zero-sum game 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
 
 
Scholars (Richardson 2000, Adshead 2002, Kohler-Koch 2002) suggest that policy 
networks seem to be the right approach to the study of the politics today. According to 
Richardson: ‘the relative decline of the term ‘policy community’ from political 
analysis and its displacement by policy networks might seem to be an appropriate 
reflection of the shift from government to governance: ‘there has been a movement 
from the central control of policy by a core executive to more diffuse forms of co-
operation among a variety of actors’ (Richardson 2000, 1007). Adshead also suggests 
that: ‘Multi-Level governance analysis is based on three main assumptions. First, 
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decision-making competencies are shared by actors at different levels rather than 
monopolized by state executives. Second, collective decision-making between 
member states implies some loss of control by individual state executives. And third, 
political arenas are interconnected rather than nested.’ (Adshead, 2002: 5) Elaborating 
from this point one can therefore argue that the EU multi-level governance framework 
is ideal for policy networks to emerge. This is happening because the multi-level 
system of governance provides many opportunities for actors to get involved in 
different stages of the EU planning in order  to influence the final outcome. ESDP is 
no exception to the rule. The creation of policy networks is a historic process which 
has been manifested at the early stages of the predecessor of ESDP: ‘The CSFP has 
induced policy networks, generally very loose and sometimes only nascent during the 
EPC era, to become more cohesive.’ (Peterson and Bomberg 1999: 246). 
 
However, the involvement of actors in policy networks does not leave their identities 
unaffected by the transactions that take place on a frequent basis.2 Persuasion, 
pressure from colleagues, the idea of being left behind or being cut off from a major 
new project and the fear of isolation all play an important role in changing actor 
preferences.3 Therefore, it is important to say that policy networks are based on 
personal relationships between known and trusted individuals who share similar 
beliefs. It is the position and roles which actors perform which are crucial. Therefore, 
according to Marsh and Smith: ‘The relationships within the networks are structural 
because they: define the roles which actors play within networks, prescribe the issues 
which are discussed and how they are dealt with; have distinct sets of rules; and 
contain organizational imperatives, so that at least, there is a major pressure to 
maintain the network.’ (Marsh and Smith 2000: 5). It is also evident that network 
participants want to be ‘milieu shapers’ and do not want to be left behind when it 
comes to new initiatives. This may also lead policy networks to a kind of 
‘sociological functionalism’ performance, a functionalism that is not based on pure 
policy expansion because of the natural interrelated nature of policies but on the case 
that  policy actors are sociologically inclined to ‘invent’ new policies. Therefore, it is 
worth examining the process of functionalism from a sociological point of view. 
However, one must also take into consideration the fact that since a network consists 
of an unstable pattern of relations amongst its participants it is not going to be always 
an influential and innovative policy mechanism. Sporadic peer pressure and weak 
forms of persuasion in a network might have limited effects and the phenomenon of 
‘sociological functionalism’ might indeed be limited or even non-existent in many 
policy networks who have a limited range of policy implementation. 
 
 
I expect that the study of the immediate post Cold War period would have led to the 
formation of ‘amorphous policy networks’. Amorphous policy networks are 
                                                 
2 As Marsh and Smith suggest: ‘Networks involve the institutionalisation of beliefs, values, cultures 
and particular forms of behaviour. They are organizations which shape attitudes and behaviour. 
Networks result from repeated behaviour and, consequently, they relieve decision makers of taking 
difficult decisions; they help routinize behaviour. (Marsh and Smith 2000: 6) 
3 In this point it is important to mention Krahmnann’s experiment. Krahmann conducted a survey on 
external/peer pressure on actors in order to demonstrate that belonging into a network will affect the 
actors behaviour. As Krahmnann suggests: ‘As multilevel network theory suggests rational actors 
should not, and, as the case studies confirm, do not ignore the policy preferences of the majority of 
actors to whom they are linked in their network, regardless of their motives or strength of their 
convictions.’ (Krahmann 2003: 151). 
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amorphous groups of national individuals of foreign ministries and of sections of 
organisations (e.g. NATO). These groups of individuals interact sporadically by 
exchanging opinions. This interaction might lead to alliance formations but also to the 
formation of groups that compete with each other. Members of the policy network 
have similar belief-systems (although not identical) and share perspectives on a 
number of foreign policy issues. During times of high uncertainty networks can be 
influential in forming the agenda by promoting certain policy options. Amorphous 
policy networks can from time to time act united in search of a common solution but 
their interaction is still taking place under an ‘intergovernmental’ framework. The 
network is characterised by a volatile nature, unstable relations, non-permanent, 
sporadic action, low levels of integration, non-institutionalised rules and  open 
membership to those who comply with the commonly accepted ideational criteria. 
The notion of ‘amorphous ESDP policy networks’ will help us decode the first and 
the second phase of interaction (nascent and ascendant phase). However, according to 
Richardson if policy networks are becoming weak other forms of alternative venues 
of influence will be created (Richardson 2000).  
 
 
4. Politico-Epistemic Communities (POECs) 
 
Much of the literature on policy and epistemic community overlaps thus leading the 
reader to a confusion on what constitutes a policy/epistemic community and where are 
the limits of the distinction between the two notions. In his analysis of the definition 
Haas suggests that it is not so much the name which is important but rather the 
functioning of these communities. Following from this point the section combines 
various elements of the literature on policy and epistemic communities in order to 
provide a cohesive framework of what constitutes a political community. Elements 
from both notions of epistemic and policy community are merged into a new version 
of community group which is named Politico-Epistemic Community (POEC). The 
aim of this exercise is to unite useful elements from both theories into one in order to 
construct an inclusive model of a policy community. The second important element is 
that areas of overlap in both theories are only mentioned once thus allowing the 
research to focus on the strong points of the theory and avoid useless repetition.  
 
 
i. introduction 
 
Peter Haas used the concept of ‘epistemic community’ in order to describe a group of 
actors ‘who come to share a common interpretation of the science behind a problem 
and the broad policy and political requirements in response to it’ (Gough and 
Shackley 2001: 329-345). According to Haas an epistemic community is ‘a network 
of professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain and 
an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue area.’ 
(Haas 1992: 3).  The term ‘community’ was chosen deliberately to reflect the intimate 
relationship between groups and departments, the development of common 
perceptions and the development of a common language for describing policy 
problems (Richardson 1993: 93). Epistemic communities are usually made of 
professionals, researchers and scientists who share similar policy ideas and seek to 
influence decisions in their specialist policy domain. The members of an epistemic 
community are bound together by shared beliefs, ideas and possibly worldviews. 
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Therefore, scientific knowledge is the glue that keeps actors committed and can be 
used as a trump card against opponents of the epistemic coalition (Gough & Shackley 
2001: 329-345). Although an epistemic community may consist of professionals from 
a variety of disciplines and backgrounds, they are bound together by common norms 
and practises. This is happening because they share (1) a shared set of normative and 
principled beliefs, which provide a value-based rationale for the social action of 
community members, (2) shared casual beliefs, which are derived from their analysis 
of practices leading or contributing to a central set of problems in their domain and 
which then serve as the basis for elucidating the multiple linkages between possible 
policy actions and desired outcomes, (3) shared notions of validity-knowledge in the 
domain of their expertise, and (4) a common policy enterprise-that is, a set of 
common practices associated with a set of problems to which their professional 
competence is directed, presumably out of the conviction that human welfare will be 
enhanced as a consequence (Haas 1992: 3). According to Ruggie, epistemic 
communities may be said to consist of ‘interrelated roles which grow up around an 
episteme; they delimit, for their members, the proper construction of social reality’ 
(Ruggie 1975: 569-70).  
 
Although the notion of epistemic communities is a useful one it still suffers from 
certain weaknesses. The EU geopolitical milieu includes a variety of other actors (e.g. 
media, policy makers, NGOs). Therefore the cross fertilization of epistemic 
communities with policy communities is necessary.  Although professionals and 
scientists are important when it come to policy formulation they are not the only 
players on the block. Politicians, national elites, parliamentarians members of the high 
echelons of diplomacy also form part of the EU geopolitical milieu. The notion of 
policy communities directly deals with the way policy-makers behave in order to 
reach a decision. According to Stone et al (2001): ‘Policy Communities are stable 
networks of policy actors from both inside and outside government, which are highly 
integrated with the policy-making process. These are based on common 
understandings of problems or of the decision-making process within a given policy 
domain’. Therefore, policy communities can be seen as: ‘a special type of stable 
network, which has advantages in encouraging bargaining in policy resolution. In this 
language the policy network is a statement of shared interests in a policy problem: a 
policy community exists where there are effective shared ‘community’ views on the 
problem. Where there are no such shared views no community exists’ (Jordan 1990: 
327).   
 
Politico-Epistemic Communities emerge and consolidate around specific policy fields 
or subsystems and evolve around relevant institutions such as specific ministries or 
government agencies. A politico-epistemic community (POEC) is ‘a transnational 
coalition of various players  within and outside the policy process who try to influence 
the policy decision mechanism by  promoting the diffusion of a particular 
‘knowledge’. By performing this task politico-epistemic communities introduce 
policy alternatives, thus influencing the selection of policies, and promote the 
building of national and international coalitions in support of their chosen policies. By 
pointing out which alternatives are not viable on the basis of their causal 
understanding of the problems to be addressed, the POE community members can 
limit the range of alternatives under consideration. Actors within a politico-epistemic 
community share many views and ideas. The sharing of a ‘common normative 
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framework can lead to the creation of a strong sense of solidarity which might in turns 
lead to the establishment of a common identity amongst the actors involved.  
 
The issue of common identity of members is the great distinction between networks 
and politico-epistemic communities. Due to a common identity policy communities 
are to shape the debate and move decisions away from the lowest common 
denominator. This is contrary to what is taking place within EU networks: to discuss 
problems and find a lowest common denominator solution. The transformation from 
network to communities will occur when long-term changes in the relationships 
amongst the participants can indicate a permanent transformation of the policy 
process within EU policy networks. It is expected that much of the work of the actors 
who before the establishment of ESDP participated in policy networks will now take 
place within ESDP institutions. If this is not the case then the problem of ‘competing 
networks’ should be taken into account as it might pose major challenge to the 
development of ESDP.  
 
 
ii. characteristics of Politico-Epistemic Communities 
 
The idea of politico-epistemic community is based on the notion of community. Being 
member of a community implies that one shares strong personal relations with the rest 
of its members as most of the members know each other and share with them long 
parts of their lives. A consequence of frequent interaction is that a mutual 
understanding is shaped amongst the members of a community. In all forms of 
community, special ties exist amongst its members who prefer to co-operate with each 
other rather than with alien outsiders. Consequently, community members share 
affective relationships of mutual support. One of the very fundamental communal 
elements of any social system is a sense of solidarity (Clark 1973). Communal 
solidarity reinforces the idea of belonging to a group and increases the internal 
cohesion of a community. Respect for the other members of the community is also a 
vital rule for co-existence. 
 
A Politico-Epistemic Community represents a ‘negotiated’ order achieved through a 
process of pragmatic improvisation and accommodation that must be continually 
‘worked at’ (based on Richardson and Jordan 1979: 101). Therefore, the process of 
drafting common positions is important because this is when the improvisation and 
ideational accommodation takes place. A politico-epistemic community is 
characterised by a balance of power among its members. Although a certain group of 
individuals may dominate the group there is still room for all the other members to 
express their concerns and interests (a positive-sum game). In terms of 
institutionalisation politico-epistemic communities display a consensus on policy 
principles and procedures to approach policy problems. A  politico-epistemic 
community can be thus perceived as a type of sub-government ‘that is a stable, tight 
and continuing arrangement’. (based on Grant Jordan and William Maloney 1997: 
559). Politico-epistemic communities may be ‘ad hoc’ and not outlive the policy issue 
which formed them, or be more constant and aim at a broader impact on ‘dominant 
social discourses (based on Haas 1992: 371). 
 
The membership of a politico-epistemic community is not open to all and is restricted 
to those who can fulfil certain professional or educational standards. Grant enriches 
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the basic model of policy communities by offering his version of a ‘closed policy 
community’ whose aspects can be used when it comes to politico-epistemic 
Communities. Wallace and Wallace also mention the phenomenon of closed policy 
communities which characterises much of the EU dealings: ‘By and large the 
definitions of relevant networks suggest that they have an open and inclusive nature, 
thus admitting access to those who can find an entry-point. The growth of rather more 
closed policy communities in the fields of monetary, foreign, and home affairs may 
need some adjustment of the argument about policy networks.’ (Wallace and Wallace 
2000). The closed politico-epistemic community concept has the following 
characteristics: First of all the absence of sustained public interest in the policy arena 
considered by the policy community, a low public profile (visibility of decisions) and 
low party political attention level. Second, technical expertise and professional 
knowledge is regarded essential and thirdly it is important to achieve broad public 
satisfaction with the quality of the service the community provides (Grant 2005: 301-
316). In order to construct a closed policy community a consensus is necessary about 
the nature of its tasks.  The use of public sector resources must be relatively low (not a 
high spender) and the task is often perceived to be ‘technical’, thus not raising issues 
of political concern.  
 
However, even if a POEC is a ‘closed’ community this does not mean that interaction 
takes place only within the community itself as POEC members do not underestimate 
the importance of cultivating relations with other influential actors. The members of a 
politico-epistemic community will do whatever possible in order to convince other 
actors that their ideas are important. This is happening ‘through production of 
policy/research papers as well as actively lobbying the other important actors. (based 
on Gough & Shackley 2001). Members of politico-epistemic communities can also 
consolidate their power by occupying niches in advisory and regulatory bodies. This 
is how they exert direct influence on national governments and international 
organizations. (based on Haas 1992: 30). The process of influence in 
international/transnational epistemic communities is similar to that of the nationally 
based epistemic communities. According to Haas ‘ideas may take root in an 
international organization or in various state bodies, after which they are diffused to 
other states via the decision makers who have been influenced by the ideas. As a 
result the community can have a systemic impact’. (Haas 1992: 17). The more a 
politico-epistemic community can consolidate bureaucratic power within 
national/international organizations, the more possibilities it has to institutionalise its 
influence and insinuate its views into broader international politics (Haas 1992:4). 
According to Haas: ‘It is the political infiltration of an epistemic community into 
governing institutions which lays the groundwork for a broader acceptance of the 
community’s beliefs and ideas about the proper construction of social reality’ (Haas 
1992: 27). In practice this can be interpreted as the forging of short-term alliances 
based on common research and concerns between members of the community and 
other professions (Haas 1992: 19). However, it is expected that as policy actors are 
socialised within particular structures on a permanent basis certain forms of stable 
alliances will also be part of the game.  
 
The ‘core’ of the politico-epistemic community consists of policy makers and related 
professionals but its ‘communication network’ may involve interaction with many 
other players such as academics, lobbies, movements, political parties, community 
leaders and think tanks. Integrating various actors into a common project is one of the 
 16
tasks of the POE community. A politico-epistemic community can come to exert 
considerable political influence by including a wide range of policy actors who could 
(otherwise) disrupt policy development (based on Gough & Shackley 2001). 
However, it is not only policy makers who are influenced by POE communities but it 
is also possible that the opposite effect will take place. Therefore, constructing a wide 
and effective network of support is an important task for the future of the community 
because in order ‘to influence policies, transnational actors need, first, channels into 
the political system of the target state and, second, domestic partners with the ability 
to form winning coalitions. Ideas promoted by transnational alliances or epistemic 
communities do not matter much unless those two conditions are met’ (Risse-Kappen 
1994: 185-214). A politico-epistemic community is obliged to operate within a given 
political culture and a particular set of institutions. When it comes to issues which are 
negotiated at both international/national level it is argued that ‘the internationally 
articulated consensus has to be translated into response measures which make sense 
nationally.’ (Gough and Shackley 2001: 334). The response options that emerge from 
this process will vary according to the characteristics of the national political culture. 
New opportunities to influence decisions will arise during periods of crises. These 
periods are the ‘windows of opportunity’ for a politico-epistemic community. Haas 
argues that uncertainty can reinforce the influence of an epistemic community 
because a decision has to be made quickly and policy makers are disoriented but in 
search of a solution that will liberate them from their dilemmas. Second, due to their 
experience and know-how POE communities can clarify the nature of the complex 
interlinkages between issues and warn actors about the dangers of staying inactive. 
Third, POE communities can help define the self-interests of a state or factions within 
it. The process of elucidation of the cause might lead to the redefinition of 
preconceived interests or to the identification of new interests. (based on Haas’s 
analysis of epistemic communities 1992: 15).  
 
The study of politico-epistemic communities focuses on the process through which 
consensus is reached within a given domain of expertise and through which the 
consensual knowledge is diffused and carried forward by other actors. The aim of the 
research is to demonstrate the levels of political influence that a politico-epistemic 
community can have on collective policymaking, rather than the correctness of the 
advice given (based on Haas 1992: 23). In order to analyse the processes leading to 
policy coordination in a specific area scholars describe the membership and shared 
beliefs of an expert community, trace the community’s actions, and discuss its impact. 
(based on Haas 1992: 5) However, it is not always easy to pin down all the elements 
that make a politico-epistemic community as certain communities are characterised by 
a closed and secretive structure.  
 
In terms of working practices, politico-epistemic communities have common causal 
methods, professional judgement, notions of validity, their own vocabulary and 
consensual knowledge (based on Adler & Haas 1992). However although members of 
an epistemic community might share similar views this does not exclude the 
emergence of debates on what solution is best to a given problem. Debates on which 
policy path is the right to follow are common within politico-epistemic communities. 
However, although differences may arise members are bounded together by an 
element of solidarity. The sense of solidarity amongst members of an epistemic 
community derives not only from their shared interests, ideas and cosmopolitan 
beliefs but also from the fact that they have common objectives. The structure of each 
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politico-epistemic community and the degree of interaction amongst its members 
plays an important role in determining what bonds of solidarity are built amongst its 
members.  
 
As it is the case with the epistemic communities, the role of ideas is very important in 
politico-epistemic communities as well. Ideas can be used  as ‘policy viruses’ thus 
altering the policies of a policy community. Therefore, new ideas can be also 
perceived as a threat if they pose a challenge against the ‘ideational acquis’ of a 
particular community. (Richardson 2000: 1017-18). Policy communities can adopt 
many different reactions to new ideas which will have an impact on the future of the 
community itself: ‘first they (policy communities) could accept their own demise in 
the face of the new ‘virus’. Secondly, they could adapt or ‘mutate’ the virus itself. 
Thirdly they could themselves mutate in order to survive.’ (Richardson 2000: 1019). 
This is also the case for the politico-epistemic communities. However ideas need their 
‘ideational entrepreuners’ (Checkel) in order to become part of the discourse of the 
politico-epistemic community. 
 
One should notice that a politico-epistemic community can be constructed but this 
does not mean that it will survive the challenges of its times neither that it will always 
be able to influence policy-making. A group of various actors (policy officials, elites, 
political leaders, government institutions, scientists) which had once shown an interest 
in a particular question can become disinvolved for some reason. On the other hand it 
is also evident that the interest that has united different actors in a community might 
also fade away and this will mean the end of the community (based on Baumgartner 
and Jones 1993: 8). In addition, politico-epistemic communities can also get the 
blame if a policy they have supported proves wrong. A wrong policy choice may thus 
lead to the weakening of the epistemic community or even to its final demise. Due to 
government change and different political systems within the EU member states one 
cannot underestimate the power of fluidity and change that can prove lethal to the 
influence of an EU politico-epistemic community. A possible change in government, 
a reshuffle, an electoral defeat of an politico-epistemic community-friendly party 
might bring changes to ministerial posts and departmental expertees and thus diminish 
(or increase) the influence of this particular POE community.  
 
Problems can also emerge from the level of success of a particular politico-epistemic 
community. For instance, the success of policy communities can result in what 
Richardson calls ‘overcrowding’ as other autonomous players demand entry to the 
policy community. As a result, ‘policy communities and networks may become linked 
in a rather messy and unpredictable chain of actors, who do not know each other well 
and who do not speak the same ‘language’’ (Richardson 2000: 1008). The idea of 
forming short term alliances is also put under the spot when Richardson suggests that: 
‘Promiscuity not only begets more promiscuity – it also breeds mistrust between 
actors. The sheer number of actors, and the enormous diversity that they bring to 
Brussels, makes it unlikely that the kind of policy community politics which often 
characterised post-cold welfare states can be established, except where highly 
specialised and detailed technical issues are being resolved.’ (Richardson 2000: 1015) 
 
It has been suggested that strategic culture can be measured in ‘thin’ and ‘thick 
versions (Meyer 2005). If one applies the idea of ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ culture to networks 
and communities it is expected that single issue networks and loose policy networks 
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will fit the first category. On the contrary tight policy networks and politico-epistemic 
communities seem to have a thicker culture and will be categorised in the second 
level. If the ESDP mechanism is dominated by ‘thin’ networks then a thin strategic 
culture is expected to be developed. On the other hand if ‘thick’ communities are part 
of the game then it is expected that a ‘thicker’ version of strategic culture will emerge.  
 
‘thin’ strategic culture ‘thick’ strategic culture 
 
 
Single issue networks, loose policy 
networks,  
 
 
Tight policy networks, EPOCs 
  
 
 
6. Communities, networks and measuring strategic culture 
 
The paper examined the importance of policy networks/communities and institutions 
in the geopolitical milieu of the EU. In the beginning of this paper I have suggested 
that the point of departure is that of security community. Without the construction of a 
‘no war’ community any other development in the field of security and defence would 
have been an impossible mission. So far it has been argued that the whole process of 
ESDP policy formulation takes place through the creation of different policy networks 
which are characterised by a fluid and unpredictable nature. The influence of these 
networks should not be underestimated as they are capable of shaping the outcomes of 
decision-making. Furthermore, policy networks/communities contribute to the 
institutionalisation of beliefs, values, cultures and particular forms of behaviour. 
However, offering a mere description of network activities does not provide answers 
to the development of ESDP. According to Adshead: ‘Critics argue that the difficulty 
with networks is that once they have been used to characterise the policy process, 
their explanatory utility is exhausted. (Adshead 2002:19). The way to get out of a 
vicious circle of a mere description of actors activities in a network is to study its full-
term evolution within a wider framework of institutional interaction. If the network 
has evolved in a politico-epistemic community then the policy outcome identified is 
more important than a simple intergovernmental elite transaction. The main aim of 
studying the EU policy network is to see to what extent it has acquired the 
characteristics of an integrated politico-epistemic community.  
 
It is expected that there is a process of evolution in the life of networks. (see table 3). 
Debates and policy issues might lead to the formation of single issue networks or 
loose policy communities. As cooperation within loose networks intensifies it is 
expected that networks will acquire a ‘tighter’ nature and will be upgraded to tight 
policy networks. If a common identity within actors of a network is consolidated it is 
possible to talk about the creation of a politico-epistemic community. The process of 
upgrading resembles to that of a pyramid where at the lower end single issue networks 
are located. In a bottom-up mode networks are transformed into thicker versions of 
cooperation.   
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